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Abstract
An often-overlooked impact of China’s policy of maintaining low interest has been the suppression of
household interest income, which has increased the propensity of households to save while decreasing their
consumption rates. This paper posits that from 2000 to 2007, deposit rates in China were suppressed annually
by around 720 basis points, imposing an implicit tax on annual per-capita income of 12.8% on average.
Raising deposit rates will increase household income and boost consumption in the medium-term if the
Chinese government is able to initiate policy shifts that distribute the gains of economic growth more
equitably to households. Research advised by Stephen Roach.
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1. Introduction 
The economic development of China over the past three decades is 
unprecedented in modern economic history. When Deng Xiaoping launched 
his vision for a new China at the end of the 1970s, China’s economy was in 
shambles.  The Cultural Revolution had brought the nation to a standstill and 
the economy remained entrenched in a centrally-planned socialist regime.  
Since then, by dismantling the command-and-control economy that defined 
the socialist state, the Chinese government has methodically instituted a 
series of reforms that have transformed the nation from a Maoist self-reliant 
state to today’s burgeoning export powerhouse.   These reforms—and the 
subsequent “opening up of China”—are central to the overarching goals of 
the Chinese central government, which, as it perceives them, are to foster 
growth and development while simultaneously maintaining social stability.   
As part of an implicit social contract between the government and 
households, the Chinese Communist Party-run government has directed 
economic development through a series of five-year plans that promulgate 
an image of pragmatism and across-the-board synchronization.  Fiscal and 
monetary policies are a critical part of these five-year plans.  Unlike the 
United States government, in which the Federal Reserve independently 
determines monetary policy while the executive and legislative branches 
determine fiscal policy, the Chinese government blurs the line between the 
two; as both monetary and fiscal policies are controlled by the central 
government and used in concert to pursue the state’s policy goals.  
Unfettered by a public system of checks and balances, the Chinese power 
structure wields significantly more authority in executing policy changes 
than do the governments of most developed countries.   
At its core, any enacted economic policy can be seen as a transfer of 
wealth from one segment of the economy to another.  Economic resources 
are extracted from one sector through a tax and transferred to another sector 
through a subsidy.  In the aggregate, the decisions made by Chinese policy-
makers over time on such tradeoffs reveal that the government has followed 
the Asian development model and pinned its growth objectives to the rapid 
development of the nation’s export-driven industrial sector.  By design, the 
business sector of China’s economy, and specifically the state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs), has been on the receiving end of much of these transfers.  
While this has led to significant growth, even Wen Jiabao, China’s Premier, 
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has characterized the outcome as being “unstable, unbalanced, 
uncoordinated, and ultimately unsustainable.”1   
What is often forgotten is that the transfer of wealth to fund a certain 
subsidy for one sector has to originate from another sector.  In China, that 
source has, more often than not, been the households.  The introductory 
economics axiom that households benefit from strong economic growth 
through the disbursement of dividends because firms are owned and/or 
staffed by households breaks down when analyzing China.  As a whole, 
Chinese households have received a disproportionally small share of the 
economic gains of the nation’s growth compared to the business and 
government sectors while at the same time bearing a disproportionally large 
share of the costs of subsidizing this growth. In other words, there has been a 
continual net transfer of wealth from Chinese households to the business and 
government sectors over the past few decades. The result has been the 
persistent suppression of the personal income share of the Chinese economy 
to around 60%, which is towards the lower end of the OECD countries.2   
One of the main enablers of this wealth transfer from the households 
has been the suppression of both lending and deposit rates in China.  
Through a system of strict capital controls where the state directly manages 
the banking sector and financial intermediation, the government has been 
able to maintain a financial system that perpetuates financial repression, 
which is defined as the suppression of interest rates below market clearing 
levels.  Such a policy reduces the cost of capital for borrowers in the economy, 
namely enterprises and the government.  However, households are forced to 
pay an implicit tax by being undercompensated on their interest income from 
their saving deposits.   
The strategy of this paper is first to measure the implicit tax that 
households are forced to pay because of the suppressed interest rate policies.  
I will then explore the contribution of foregone household interest income to 
the idiosyncratic behaviors of Chinese households, and specifically that of 
their high savings rate and low consumption rate. Section 2 recapitulates the 
relevant literature on interest rate liberalization and financial repression in 
China.  Section 3 lays out the policy and theoretical framework that has 
guided Chinese decision-making in this area.  Section 4 discusses the impact 
of suppressed interest rates on other segments of the economy.  Section 5 
outlines the methodology for measuring the net costs borne by households 
                                                           
1 Roach, Stephen S. The Next Asia. Wiley, 2009. Chapter 3. 
2 Aziz, Jahangir, et al. “Explaining China’s Low Consumption: The Neglected Role of 
Household Income.” IMF Working Paper. WP/07/181. July 2007. 
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and the impact of reduced interest income on per-capita incomes from 2000 
to 2007.  Section 6 summarizes and analyzes the results.  Section 7 examines 
the impact of the implicit tax on saving and consumption rates and how the 
liberalization of interest rates may change household behavior.  Section 8 
discusses policy implications and challenges of reform.   Section 9 concludes.  
 
2. Literature Review 
 The topic of suppressed interest rates in the Chinese economy has 
been widely noted in the academic literature.  The liberalization of interest 
rates is often pointed to as a necessary next step for the continued 
modernization of China’s economy.  
 Bai, et al. (2001) characterized the system of financial repression in 
China as a type of implicit flat tax levied on the non-state sector by the 
government.   They argue that a combination of suppressed interest rates, 
strict capital controls, and state control of the banking system allows the 
government to increase its net revenue by reducing interest expenses.  The 
authors posit that such a policy is effective in lieu of an income tax in 
developing countries where tax policies are not well-developed.3   
 Feyzioglu, et al. (2009) explored the potential impact of interest rate 
liberalization on financial intermediation and the cost of capital in China.  
They find that liberalization will likely result in higher interest rates, 
discourage marginal investment, improve the effectiveness of intermediation 
and monetary transmission, and enhance the financial access of underserved 
sectors.4 
 A handful of papers have attempted to quantitatively measure the 
impact of suppressed interest rates on various segments of society.  Ferri, et 
al. (2010) found that the cost of capital for SOEs was unnaturally low even 
though the SOEs were less profitable and had greater debt burdens 
compared to other private Chinese enterprises.  They calculated that if the 
SOEs were forced to pay interest at market rates, their existing profits would 
be wiped out.5   
                                                           
3 Bai, Chongen, et al. “Financial Repression and Optimal Taxation.” Economics Letters. V. 70. 
Pg. 245-251, 2001. 
4 Feyzioglu, et al. “Interest Rate Liberalization in China.” IMF Working Paper. WP/09/171. 
Aug 2009. 
5 Ferri, Geiovanni. “Honor Thy Creditors Beforan Thy Shareholders: Are the Profits of 
Chinese State-Owned Enterprises Real?” Asian Economic Papers 9:3. 2010. 
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Using “back-of-the-envelope” calculations, Pettis (2010) estimated 
that deposit rates had been repressed by at least 450 basis points for the last 
decade. 6  For his calculation, Pettis relied on ratios based on the theoretical 
steady state between nominal GDP growth and interest rates.  He then 
applied the difference in interest rates to total household deposits in 2010 to 
calculate that households paid approximately 5% of GDP in the form of 
unpaid interest payments to the banks.  
In another analysis, Lardy (2008) calculated the implicit tax imposed 
on households by the decline in real rates of return on savings deposits due 
to rising inflation. He estimated how much higher household interest income 
would have been in the first quarter of 2008 if households had received the 
same real rate of interest on their net renminbi (RMB)-denominated saving 
deposits as in 2002.  He calculated the figure to equal 4.1% of 2008 GDP.7   
Although the existing studies shed light on the cost of suppressed 
deposit rates for households, they do not attempt to measure the net impact 
on household incomes of such policies over time in an analytically rigorous 
way.  I focus on this issue in the following sections. 
 
3. Theory and Policy 
National economies are anchored by monetary policy, which defines 
the terms of engagement between lenders and borrowers. More specifically, 
the role of monetary policy is to intermediate the transfer of savings, or 
foregone consumption, into investments by setting interest rates.  Typically, 
interest rates act as a pricing mechanism for the allocation of capital in 
liberalized economies; it is a policy lever used as a stabilizing force for the 
macro-economy.  Governments in developed countries adjust interest rates 
with the goal of promoting sustainable growth and/or price stability.   
Prior to the Deng’s economic reforms beginning in 1979, interest 
rates were arbitrarily determined by planning authorities, and thus played 
no active role in regulating the supply and demand of funds.8  As the 
economy slowly shifted towards a market-based system, the government 
                                                           
6 Pettis, Michael. “Who will pay for China’s bad loans?” China Financial Markets. 11 April 
2010. http://mpettis.com/2010/04/who-will-pay-for-chinas-bad-loans/. Accessed 22 
March 2011.  
7 Lardy, Nicholas. “Financial Repression in China.” Peterson Institute for International 
Economics. Policy Brief. September 2008.  
8 Chen, Chien-Hsun. “Interest rates, savings and income in the Chinese economy.” Journal of 
Economic Studies; 2002; 29, 1; ABI/INFORM Global. Pg. 59. 
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began to move towards adjusting rates as a counter-cyclical policy tool.  The 
interest rate policy lever was bequeathed to the People’s Bank of China (PBC), 
China’s newly designated central bank, when the National People’s Congress 
passed its first central bank law on March 18, 1995.  The new law established 
a mandate for China’s monetary policy, which was to maintain currency 
stability, and it gave the PBC the legal right to formulate and implement such 
monetary policy.9  While on paper the PBC had the sole authority to control 
and supervise the financial system, it was still directly subordinate to the 
ruling State Council, and thus lacked independence.10 
Due to the one-party system in China, the government is able to 
marshal policies across every sector to pursue its fundamental goal of 
promoting rapid economic growth and development.  As such, the interest 
rate has been commandeered to pursue the fiscal policy of continuously 
boosting nationwide investment by keeping rates perpetually low—instead 
of acting as a neutral guide for promoting the efficient allocation of capital.  
Due in part to this subsidy, investment has accounted for a much larger share 
of China’s recent GDP growth than in that of other countries.11 
 
                                                           
9 ibid 
10 ibid 
11 Prasad, Eswar. “Is the Chinese growth miracle built to last?” China Economic Review, 20 
(2009) 103-123. 28 May 2008. 
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The PBC controls interest rates in China by setting two benchmark 
rates: the one-year lending rate and the one-year deposit rate. Both have 
been suppressed far below what economic theory and sound macro 
management practices would suggest.  According to economic theory, there 
is a long-term steady-state relationship between lending rates and the 
nominal GDP growth rate.12   This equilibrium construct of interest rates 
allows for the benefits of economic growth to be shared equitably between 
lenders and borrowers.   However, according to this theory, interest rates in 
China have been far too low given China’s nominal growth rates, as seen in 
Figure 1.13   
Suppressed interest rates have been one of the most significant pro-
growth policies implemented by the government to nurture the development 
of the state sector, which includes SOEs, state-controlled banks (SCBs), and 
the government itself.  Beginning in the late 1990s, low lending rates have 
reduced the cost of capital for the businesses and government institutions, 
which have stimulated the pursuit of high investment by businesses and local 
governments to pursue high investment.  Furthermore, the PBC has set the 
benchmark deposit rate even lower, guaranteeing the SCBs a substantial 
profit due to the sizeable spread between the amount they pay out as deposit 
interest and the amount they receive as interest on the loans they underwrite.  
A study by Avery (2009) found that China’s SCBs enjoyed a spread, averaging 
343 basis points from 2000 to 2007, which was roughly twice the 
international average.14 15  The Chinese government guarantees this large 
interest rate spread for its SCBs because the government leans on these 
banks for policy-driven lending. 
While households have experienced the trickle-down benefits of 
economic growth, they have also been forced to bear the cost of promoting 
such growth.  Households face a policy regime of financial repression where 
low real rates of return on their savings deposits have suppressed interest 
incomes while strict capital controls limit alternative investment options.  
Because of the financial repression, households are forced to pay an 
unavoidable implicit tax by being severely undercompensated on their 
savings deposits.16  The burden of low interest rates borne by households has 
been further increased due to the rise of inflation in recent years.  When 
                                                           
12 Feyzioglu, et al. “Interest Rate Liberalization in China.” 
13 Data from Bloomberg 
14 Avery, Martha. China’s Emerging Financial Markets: Challenges and Global Impact. Wiley. 
2009. P.Iii. 
15 National Bureau of Statistics of China.  
16 Bai. “Financial Repression and Optimal Taxation.” 
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inflation reached double digits from 1993 to 1996, the Chinese government 
implemented a policy of fiscal subsidy to ensure a non-negative real interest 
rate on household deposits.17  However, such a policy has not been enacted 
during recent bouts of inflation.  Because the consumer price index (CPI) has 
spiked higher than the suppressed nominal deposit rates on multiple 
occasions over the past decade, households have at times suffered from a 
negative real rate of return on their deposits as seen in Figure 2.18  In June 
2007, the benchmark one-year deposit rate was raised to 3.33% while the 
tax rate on bank interest income was cut from 20% to 5%.19  However, the 
effective after-tax deposit rate of 3.16% was still below 4.75%, the CPI at the 
time.  Since inflation produces capital losses by reducing the real value of 
existing financial asset holdings, households are actually losing money when 
they deposit their earnings into savings accounts during times of high 
inflation.20 
    
 
                                                           
17 Ma, Guonan, et al. “China’s high saving rate: myth and reality.” Bank of International 
Settlements Working Papers. #312. 2010.  
18 Lardy. “Financial Repression in China.” 
19 Prasad. “Is the Chinese growth miracle built to last?” 
20 Moore, B.J. “Inflation and Financial Deepening.” Journal of Developmental Economics 20 
(1986) 125-133. North-Holland.  
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In a system where the households are severely undercompensated on 
their savings deposits, it would seem natural that they would be incentivized 
to reallocate their capital to other investments with more favorable returns.  
Such a situation occurred in the United States during the 1970s, when US 
households responded to underperforming bank deposits due to a 
combination of deposit rate ceilings imposed by Regulation Q and high 
inflation by moving their assets to non-bank financial institutions. 21  
However, banks do not face this problem in China.  The average household 
has limited options for alternative investments due to strict capital controls 
placed on the economy by the government.  Although the government points 
to the dangers of liquidity flight as the reason for the strict capital controls, in 
reality, the government depends on the massive pool of household savings 
deposits, amounting to RMB 17.9 trillion ($2.55 trillion) in 2008, to fund its 
high level of state-directed investments.22  The majority of households in 
China have no choice but to leave their earnings in low-returning and 
sometimes money-losing savings deposits.  
The uneven distribution of the benefits of economic growth caused by 
inequitable economic policies has restricted household income growth in 
China.  While per-capita personal incomes have increased significantly in 
absolute terms, its growth rate has not been as fast as that of China’s 
economy.23  Simultaneously, there has been a steady rise in the cost of living 
for households.  Since the end of the Mao-era policies, the government has 
privatized social safety net programs, forcing households to allocate more 
resources to education, medical care, and retirement savings. 24   The 
combined narratives of stunted household income growth and rising safety 
net burdens in a society facing the demographic shifts of rapid aging have 
increased the propensity of households to save while putting downward 
pressure on discretionary purchasing power and consumption.   
The causal link between repressed interest rates and both high 
savings rates and low consumption rates has stark ramifications for future 
economic policy in China.  The government has previously identified limits 
on interest rates as a fundamental problem in the economy.  It not only 
suppresses household income, but also perpetuates the inefficient allocation 
of capital throughout the Chinese economy.  Over the past few years, the 
                                                           
21 Rolnick, Arthur J. “The Benefits of Bank Deposit Rate Ceilings: New Evidence on Bank 
Rates and Risk in the 1920s.” Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Quarterly Review. 
Summer 1987.  
22 Lardy. “Financial Repression in China.” 
23 Aziz, Jahangir. “Explaining China’s Low Consumption.” 
24 Ma. “China’s high saving rate.” 
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government has repeatedly declared that it will pursue the liberalization of 
interest rates.25  The call to action was repeated again by Premier Wen Jiabao 
in the 12th Five-Year Plan, “We will push forward the market-based reform of 
interest rates.”26  Raising household interest income will be a positive step 
towards the 12th Five-Year Plan’s central goal of boosting domestic 
consumption.  
However, the obstacles to liberalizing interest rates are sizable and 
numerous.  The large-scale industries and SCBs who currently depend on 
suppressed interest rates have significant political pull in the current 
government.  These groups will be opposed to any policy shifts that reduce 
the implicit subsidies businesses and banks have come to depend upon.   
Regardless, in order to realize the change in focus from export-driven 
economic growth to consumption-driven growth, the Chinese government 
must shift its economic policies from a system that heavily favors enterprises 
and the government over households to a system that distributes the benefits 
and costs of economic growth more equitably.  
 
4. Implications on Other Segments of the Economy 
 Suppressed interest rates have contributed to the inefficient 
allocation of capital throughout the Chinese economy and are responsible for 
a number of hidden costs beyond simply holding down the growth of 
household income.  Specifically, the low-interest rate regime has lessened the 
flexibility of governmental responses to macroeconomic shocks, subsidized 
over-investment, perpetuated inefficient operations at SCBs and SOEs, and 
skewed capital-labor ratios.  Liberalizing interest rates would initiate 
positive reform in all of these sectors.  However, because low interest rates 
also play a critical role in the mechanism through which the government 
manages the RMB, it is unlikely the liberalization of interest rates will occur 
as long as the government continues its policy of currency management. 
By using interest rates to drive economic growth rather than steer 
monetary policy, the government has reduced the efficacy of the policy route 
in controlling rising inflation.  The government has been forced to rely 
instead on other less effective monetary tools such as bank reserve ratios 
                                                           
25 “Interest-rate reforms to be continued: PBOC official.” China Daily. 8 Nov 2010. 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90778/90859/7191057.html. Accessed 12 Mar 
2010. 
26 Report on the Work of the Government, Delivered at the Fourth Session of the Eleventh 
National People's Congress on March 5, 2011, Wen Jiabao, Premier of the State Council 
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and lending quotas to perform the stabilizing role that interest rates play in 
more developed economies.  Policies such as lending quotas are blunter and 
cause jarring—and potentially distorting—adjustments when utilized.  
Furthermore, although such tools provide a similar signaling effect as the 
interest rate does in other countries, the impact of loan quotas on the 
Chinese economy is uneven and tends to lag behind the immediate response 
a shift in the interest rate typically brings in a developed economy. This has 
resulted in adjustments that have never been quick enough to fully reflect the 
range of cyclical factors.27   
In a developed economy, the central bank uses interest rates to guide 
capital allocation so that the market can decide the most efficient level of 
loan origination.  Such has not been the case in China where the remnants of 
the socialist planned economy remain.  Although the practice of the central 
bank imposing specific loan quotas on the four SCBs officially ended as of 
December 31, 1997, the central government now predetermines the 
availability of loans in the economy through annual loan quotas, which was 
set at RMB 7.5 trillion for 2010.28  These quotas, however, have historically 
often been ignored as a result of political pressure to pursue higher GDP 
growth driven by investment.29   
Over-investment has been often cited as a looming problem in the 
Chinese economy.  Throughout China, the desire to continue economic 
expansion has a large impact on local government decisions on resource 
allocation.  Even though the National Development and Reform Commission 
(NDRC) announced a nationwide GDP growth target of 8% in early 2011, 
only a fraction of the provincial governments have set targets below 10%.30  
Local Chinese government officials are incentivized to maximize investment 
projects since promotions are mainly determined by performance indicators 
such as the economic growth in their jurisdictions.31  Combined with the fact 
that projects with negative returns can seem profitable due to below-market 
rates, the government has invested in many money-losing projects.  This 
incentive structure has resulted in a system where some estimates consider 
that 20% of loans provided to local governments are now non-performing.32  
                                                           
27 Naughton, Barry. The Chinese Economy. The MIT Press. Cambridge, Massachusetts. 2007. 
28 Xin, et al. “China declares shift to ‘prudent’ monetary policy.” Reuters. 3 Dec 2010.  
29 Xie, Andy. “Rebalancing Cannot Wait.” Caixin Online. 11 March 2011. 
http://english.caing.com/2011-03-11/100235531_1.html. Accessed 18 March 2011. 
30 Kan, Huo. “Local Governments Still Feel Investment Pulse.” Caixin Online. 10 Feb 2011. 
http://english.caing.com/2011-02-10/100224379.html. Accessed 18 March 2011. 
31 Ma.. “China’s high savings rate myth/reality.” 
32 Dorn, James A. “Financial Repression.” 12 Aug 2010. 
http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=12053. Accessed 18 March 2011. 
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Given the elevated debt levels of the state sector, higher interest rates would 
only increase the cost of paying off these loans.   
As outlined earlier, the SCBs in China have been kept afloat by the 
generous government-mandated interest rate spread.  Furthermore, because 
the state owns a majority stake in each of the large commercial banks, the 
government implicitly guarantees the viability of the banks, allowing the 
SCBs to make gigantic mistakes without going under when lending to local 
governments and SOEs.  As a result, the screening mechanisms for new loan 
origination have been overly relaxed; decisions are made to fulfill policy 
objectives rather than shape economic viability.  This process has led to the 
high percentage of inefficient investments previously mentioned.  The SCBs 
have balked at recent initiatives from the China Banking Regulatory 
Commission (CBRC) designed to tighten credit restrictions, as branch loan 
officers are now under pressure to increase both market share and deposits, 
while simultaneously following stricter lending rules.33  The privileged 
position the SCBs hold in the Chinese economy has also stymied the 
development of competing sources of finance such as that of the corporate 
bond markets.  By reducing their spread slightly, banks are able to 
discourage firms from issuing debt in the corporate bond market and instead 
borrow from the bank, thereby keeping the bond market illiquid and 
unattractive for the private sector.    
SOEs have no qualms with allowing banks to continue dominating 
credit intermediation.  The main benefactors in an economy with repressed 
interest rates are the borrowers, and in China the main borrowers are the 
SOEs which received 65% of the total bank loans—nearly three times their 
25% share of the GDP.34  SOEs receive the bulk of the bank loans because of 
good relations with the central government.  Loan officers at the SCBs are 
overly risk-averse and issuing loans to the government-backed SOEs is 
always perceived to be a safe bet.  A 2006 IMF study found that the SCBs did 
not appear to take enterprise profitability into account when making lending 
decisions.35 The politically influenced relationship between SOEs and the 
SCBs has led to a trend where forbearance on debt has been the rule rather 
than the exception.36  Furthermore, net interest payments (as a share of GDP) 
by the non-financial corporate sector have dropped by 50% from 1992 to 
                                                           
33 Xiu, Wen, et al. “Two-Edged Tightening for Bank Credit Controls.” Caixin online. 3 Mar 
2011. http://english.caing.com/2011-03-03/100231870.html.  Accessed 15 Mar 2011.  
34 Ferri. “Honor Thy Creditors.” 
35 Podpiera, Richard. “Progress in China’s Banking Sector Reform: Has Bank Behavior 
Changed?” IMF Working Paper. March 2006.   
36 ibid  
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2007 due to suppressed rates.37  Low borrowing costs also make it easier for 
underperforming businesses to roll over their debt, as the low rates 
effectively reduce the real value of debt payments. 38  The study mentioned 
earlier by Ferri (2010) found that if the SOEs were forced to pay interest at 
market rates, their existing profits would be wiped out. 39  Due to the 
substantial implicit and explicit government subsidies, SOEs are still very 
inefficient when judged by Western standards.  With banks willing to lend at 
subsidized rates, firms tend to borrow as much as possible in order to 
finance imprudent capital-intensive projects as well as to create reserves for 
periods of credit tightening.40   The SOEs’ poor financial controls and 
corporate governance have been estimated to cost the economy 5% of GDP 
annually.41   
Although households continue to implicitly subsidize SOEs, 
households have not been fairly compensated on their financial assets.  In 
many countries that have a large presence of SOEs, the payment of dividends 
by SOEs acts as a distributing conduit of profits to households in the form of 
either government transfers or government provision of private goods such 
as healthcare and education.42  However until recently, Chinese SOEs were 
not required to pay dividends to their equity holders even though they have 
been making net profits of around 6.5 to 7 percent of GDP since 2003.43  
Capital in the form of retained earnings that should have been distributed to 
shareholders, namely the government and households, was instead 
reinvested in the companies.  While new laws now dictate that SOEs have to 
contribute 10% of profits to the state social security fund, these dividend 
payments are still much lower than international averages.44  Such a scenario 
explains why investment income in China accounts for only 8% of 
households’ disposable income, which is one of the lowest rates in the 
world.45  This statistic highlights the poor performance of the financial sector 
in distributing profits from firms to households in the form of dividends and 
interest income.  Although businesses have achieved sizeable, albeit 
inefficient success, the economic benefits they have accrued have not been 
fairly distributed to households.   
                                                           
37 Yang, et al. “Why are savings rates so high in China?” NBER Working Paper Series 16771.  
February 2011.  
38 Pettis. “Who Will Pay for China’s Bad Loans?”  
39 Ferri. “Honor Thy Creditors.” 
40 Rajan, Raghuram G. Fault Lines. Princeton University Press. Princeton, New Jersey. 2010. 
41 Ferri. “Honor Thy Creditors.” 
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One of the core goals of the 12th Five-Year plan is to increase  
employment growth, especially in China’s tertiary service sector, which 
generates 35% more jobs per unit of GDP than its secondary sector.46  
However, financial repression has kept the price of capital cheap, and along 
with subsidized energy and land prices, has skewed the capital-labor ratio.  
This has shifted production towards capital-intensive methods while 
repressing needed employment growth.47  Such a scenario is inimical to the 
government’s goals of increasing employment growth and expediting a 
transition of unemployed and underemployed rural workers to employment 
in more labor-intensive and services.48  Not only are low interest rates 
reducing household incomes, they are also reducing the number of jobs 
available.  
The market liberalization of interest rates in China would unleash a 
series of adjustments that would spur necessary modernizations of the 
financial system and industry practices.  Liberalized interest rates would 
increase the efficacy of interest rates as a monetary policy lever.  In the long-
term, interest rate liberalization would also increase the efficiency of capital 
allocation throughout the Chinese economy by forcing banks to be more 
prudent in their investment decisions, SOEs to increase their operating 
efficiency and transparency, and the government to reduce excess 
investment.49  While the short-term frictions caused by these adjustments 
may be onerous, the costs of not taking action only increase with time.   
                                                           
46 Wang, Qing, Steven Zhang, and Ernest Ho, “The China Files: Chinese Economy through 
2020,” Morgan Stanley Blue Paper, November 8, 2010. 
47 Prasad. “Is the Chinese growth miracle built to last?” 
48 ibid 
49 Feyzioglu, et al. “Interest Rate Liberalization in China.” 
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5. Methodology of the Model 
This analysis aims to determine the magnitude of the aforementioned 
transfer of wealth from Chinese households to other segments of the 
economy from 2000-2007.50  The methodology can be separated into two 
main parts: 1) deriving proxies for China’s deposit rate in a free market 
environment and 2) calculating the magnitude of the implicit tax paid by 
households due to the difference between actual and market-determined 
deposit rates. 
A Market-Determined Interest Rate 
The retroactive derivation of what levels Chinese deposit rates should 
have been set at under liberalized, or marketized, conditions is an inexact 
science.  A model-based approach is used to estimate such a proxy for the 
deposit rate in three different ways.  The aim of the first proxy is to 
determine where deposit rates would have been set if the SCBs were not 
granted such a large spread between lending rates and deposit rates.  The 
second proxy measures what deposit rates would have been if they had been 
set to hold real returns on deposits (net inflation) constant at the 2002 level.  
The third proxy aims to find what deposit rates should have been according 
to the theoretical steady state relationship between lending rates and 
nominal GDP growth.51    
The first proxy is found by determining what the deposit rates would 
have been if the mandated spread between the lending rate and deposit rate 
was halved while the lending rate was held constant.  First, I halved the 
annual spread between the year-end one-year lending rate and deposit rate.  
I then added this result back to that year’s actual deposit rate. The rationale 
behind this proxy is based on findings that suggest that the spreads between 
lending rates and deposit rates enjoyed by the SCBs in China are about twice 
the international average.52 
The second proxy is derived by finding the level at which the nominal 
deposit rates would have been set if they were adjusted to keep the real 
deposit rate constant at the 2002 level.  I used the real rate of deposits in 
2002 because the real rate in that year was the highest of the studied period 
(2000-2007).   The real deposit rate in 2002 was found by subtracting the 
                                                           
50 This date range was chosen because of data constraints and since it encompasses the time 
period of relative global economic stability between the Asian Financial Crisis and the sub-
prime mortgage crisis. 
51 Feyzioglu, et al. “Interest Rate Liberalization in China.” 
52 Avery. China’s Emerging Financial Markets. 
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year-end CPI-based inflation rate of -0.77%, from the nominal deposit rate of 
1.98%, resulting in a real deposit rate of 2.75 %.  I then calculated the 
nominal deposit rate needed to maintain the 2.75% real deposit rate given 
the annual inflation figure for each year in the studied period.   
To derive the final proxy, I established a series of correlations that 
would translate China’s nominal GDP growth rate to a proxy for deposit rates.  
For the baseline comparisons, I used data on Australia, Canada, the United 
States and the European Union.  These nations were chosen because they 
have been generally recognized to have reached “developed nation status.”53  
Using regressions of the economic data on these nations from 2000-2007, I 
determined the correlation between nominal GDP growth and the prime 
lending rate as well as that between the prime lending rate and the deposit 
rate. When combined, these correlations extend the theoretical steady-state 
relationship between the nominal GDP growth rate and lending rates to a 
derivation of deposit rates. In other words, the correlation was able to 
answer the question: given nominal GDP growth, what should be the prime 
lending rate, and subsequently, the deposit rate?  Nominal GDP growth is 
related to deposit rates by the following equation: 
         Derived deposit rate  
China’s annual nominal GDP growth could then be calculated and 
entered into the above equation to arrive at a projected level at which 
deposit rates would be set according to this stead-state equilibrium.   
Since China sets interest rate benchmarks using the one-year lending 
rate and the one-year deposit rate, I needed to find two rates used by 
developed economies as proxies for the Chinese benchmark rates.  For the 
lending rate proxy, I used the prime rate set by the central banks of each 
country or region used in the sample.  The prime rate is a good proxy for the 
one-year Chinese lending rate since it is the short-term interest rate charged 
by banks for short-term loans to their most creditworthy customers.54  In the 
United States, the prime rate averages about 300 basis points above the 
federal funds rate, which is the short-term interest rate at which banks lend 
balances to the US Federal Reserve. Consequently, the federal funds rate 
(sometimes called the benchmark deposit rate) of a country was used as a 
proxy for the short-term deposit rate.  As seen in Figure 3, there is a close 
                                                           
53 I considered using the Asian Tigers as another comparison, but these have inconsistent 
correlations between GDP growths, their prime rates, and their federal funds rates. 
54 “Prime Rate.” Mortgage-X, Mortgage Information Service. http://mortgage-
x.com/general/indexes/prime_rate.asp. 2011. Accessed 2 April 2011. 
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correlation between the US federal funds rate and the Certificate of Deposit 
Index (CODI), which is the Federal Reserve’s reported monthly average yield 
on 3-month Certificate of Deposit rates.55 
   
                                                           
55 “Mortgage (ARM) Indexes.” Mortgage-X, Mortgage Information Service. http://mortgage-
x.com/general/indexes/default.asp. 2011. Accessed 2 April 2011. 
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Using data from Bloomberg, I first regressed the nominal GDP growth 
of the sampled nations using the year-end national prime rates and again 
using the  prime rates of the federal funds/deposit rates.56   The regressions 
are shown below in Figures 4 and 5.57   
                                                           
56 Data from Bloomberg,  
   “Data.” The World Bank. http://data.worldbank.org/. 2011. Accessed 25 Feb 2011. 
57 See appendix for data inputs 
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The regressions resulted in the following correlations: 
1)  
a. y = predicted lending prime rate,  x = nominal GDP growth 
 
2)  
a. y = predicted  deposit rate, x = prime lending rate 
 
Equations 1) and 2) were combined in Equation 3) to relate nominal GDP 
growth to the deposit rate proxy. 
 
3)  
a. y = predicted deposit rate, x = nominal GDP growth 
Finally, China’s annual nominal GDP growth rates from 2000-2007 were 
entered into the above equation. 
The actual one-year deposit rate and the three derived proxies are graphed 
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The Implicit Household Tax  
The second part of the model applies the derived deposit rates to 
historical data in order to estimate the magnitude of the implicit tax paid by 
households due to the suppressed deposit rates.58   First, the annual net 
household interest rate income was calculated from the flow of funds data by 
subtracting household interest rate expense from household interest 
income.59  The annual implicit tax was then derived by calculating the 
difference between the actual annual interest income and the projected 
interest income under each derived deposit rate.60  The formula is as follows 




                                                           
58 Data on the aggregate annual household interest income in China was collected from the 
National Bureau of Statistics of China.   
59  It is assumed that a rise in deposit rates would be accompanied by a simultaneous and 
equal rise in lending rates.  Further, the model assumes that deposit and borrowing behavior 
remained constant as interest rates shift. 
60 The difference between rates paid on time deposits as compared to demand deposits was 
ignored. 
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The total implicit tax paid by households from 2000 to 2007 was 
calculated by summing the annual implicit tax calculated using the above 
formula.  Results are shown below in Figure 8:  
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The total implicit tax paid by households as a percentage of annual 
nominal GDP was also found.  The results found in Figure 7 were divided by 
the annual nominal GDP to arrive at the annual transfer of wealth away from 
households as a percentage of nominal GDP.  The formula is as follows and 
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The implicit tax was also calculated as a percentage of annual per-
capita income.61  The net annual per-capita costs were divided by the year-
end populations and then divided by the per-capita household income to 
arrive at this figure.  The formula is as follows and the results are shown 




                                                           
61 Annual per capita income was found by averaging the per capita urban and rural incomes 
by their respective portion of the population.   
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Projected Per-Capita Net Savings Deposits 
The final part of the model calculates what the annual per-capita net 
savings would have been under the derived deposit rates if the higher 
deposit interest income was allowed to accrue and earn interest in 
subsequent years.  
A baseline model for annual year-end deposits was established using 
data from the National Bureau of Statistics of China.  The derived deposit 
rates were than used to calculate the extra interest that would have accrued 
to households over the baseline if the central bank-controlled savings rate 
had instead been the derived rate.     
The baseline case begins with the annual year-end net savings 
deposits of Chinese households from 2000-2007 (1999 data is included as 
the starting point for all models). This was found by subtracting total 
household loans from total household deposits.  The annual increase in net 
deposits is then calculated by subtracting the previous year’s year-end net 
deposits from the current year’s net deposits.62  The net interest income for 
any given year is found by subtracting total household interest expense from 
interest income and is assumed to have accrued only on the year-end 
deposits from the previous year.  The remainder of the annual increase is 
attributed to new net deposits, which are assumed to begin earning interest 
only at the beginning of the following calendar year.  The net interest income 
and net deposits are then divided by the year-end population to arrive at the 
annual net interest income per-capita and the annual net deposits per-capita.   
The projected per-capita net saving deposits are then calculated using 
the derived deposit rates.  In accordance with the assumption that the 
interest income for any given year only accrues on the year-end net deposits 
from the previous year, the “effective interest rate” is calculated by dividing 
the actual net interest income for the given year by the year-end net deposits 
of the previous year.   In order to factor in the derived deposit rates, the 
actual “effective interest rate” was increased in proportion to the ratio of the 
derived deposit rate and the official one-year deposit rate.  
The new derived effective interest rate is then multiplied by the 
previous year’s year-end net deposits to arrive at the current year’s 
projected net interest income.  The projected net interest income and the 
calculated annual new net deposits (calculated from the baseline model) are 
                                                           
62 Data on the annual national household interest income was obtained from the flow of 
funds database available through the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS).  
23
Zhang: Impact of Suppressed Deposit Rates on Chinese Households
Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2011
added to the previous year’s year-end deposits to arrive at the current year’s 
net deposits.  This method uses the actual deposits figure for 1999 as the 
starting point and derives projected net interest incomes and year-end net 
deposits annually from 2000-2007.  The projected net interest income and 
projected net year-end deposits are divided by the annual populations to 
arrive at the per-capita figures. The methodology was repeated for each of 
the three proxies.  
The 2007 difference between the projected net deposits under the 
GDP growth proxy and the baseline was found to be RMB 8,617.  The results 








Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 8 [2011], Iss. 1, Art. 8
http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol8/iss1/8
6. Summary of Results and Analysis 
Summary Statistics Baseline Deposit1/2 Margin Constant 2002 Real GDP Proj
2000-2007 Average Deposit Rate 2.45% 4.17% 4.41% 9.69%
2000-2007 Average Margin over 
Baseline 1.72% 1.95% 7.23%
2007 Implicit Tax (Bn RMB) 179 361 1,246
2007 Implicit Tax as % of 2007 GDP 0.67% 1.36% 4.69%
2000-2007 Average Implicit Tax (Bn 
RMB) 230 239 941
2000-2007 Average Implicit Tax as % 
GDP 1.60% 1.44% 5.86%
2000-2007 Total Implicit Tax (Bn 
RMB) 1,842 1,912 7,526
2000-2007 Total Implicit Tax (2007 
Bn RMB) 1,626 1,733 6,802
2000-2007 Total Implicit Tax as % of 
2007 GDP 6.12% 6.52% 25.59%
2000-2007 Total Implicit Tax Per-
Capita (RMB) 1,427 1,473 5,804
2000-2007 Average Implicit Tax Per-
Capita (RMB) 178 184 725
2000-2007 Average Implicit Tax Per-
Capita as % of Income 1.60% 3.16% 12.83%
2007 Net Savings Balance Per-Capita 
(RMB) 10,664 12,379 12,367 19,281
2007 Margin of Net Savings Balance 
Per-Capita over Basel ine (RMB) 1,716 1,704 8,617  
The total implicit taxes paid by households in 2007 were as follows: 
1/2 Margin- RMB 179.2 bn ($24.5 bn), Constant 2002 Real Rate- RMB 361.1 
bn ($49.4 bn), GDP – RMB 1,246.4 bn ($170.6 bn).  
As a point of context, the amount the government collected in 
household income tax was RMB 319 billion, or 1.3% of GDP in 2007.63  The 
implicit tax paid by households in 2007 due to interest rate suppression 
under the GDP projected proxy (RMB 1,246 bn, 4.7% of GDP) was about four 
times the amount households paid in explicit income taxes in 2007.   
Interestingly, this means that Chinese households were paying much more in 
implicit taxes than they were in explicit taxes.  
Assuming that all additional interest that should have accrued was left 
in the savings deposits, according to the GDP proxy, households had their 
                                                           
63 Lardy. “Financial Repression in China.” 
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potential wealth reduced by a total of RMB 8,617 from 2000 to 2007.  This 
amounts to more than the average income in 2007, which was RMB 8,475.   
 Moreover, these percentages may mask the greater impact of unpaid 
interest income to rural Chinese households as compared to the impact on 
urban households. There is a significant difference between urban and rural 
incomes, and subsequently, per-capita interest incomes.  According to OECD 
research, average per-capita incomes in urban areas were 3.3 times greater 
than those in rural areas in 2009.64  
Lastly, the PBC lifted the deposit rate from 2.52% in 2006 to 4.14% in 
2007, which explains the downward shift in the implicit income tax as a 
percentage of both GDP and annual income in 2007.  
 
7. Impact of Suppressed Deposit Rates on Household Behavior 
 The large implicit taxes paid by households has contributed to the 
suppression of household income growth, which in turn has played a 
significant role in promoting the propensity of Chinese households to save.  
Chinese household savings have risen from 16% of GDP in 2000 to 23% of 
GDP in 2008.65  The rise in household savings is the result of two competing 
influences.  From 1992 to 2008 there has been a 10 percentage point decline 
in the household income share of GDP and a 10 percentage point increase in 
the average propensity to save from household disposable income.66  
Together, these two trends have led to the marked decline in household 
consumption from 55% of GDP two decades ago to 33% in 2009.67  The root 
of the high savings propensity has been hotly debated in the literature with 
suggested causes including income uncertainties engendered by the 
transition to the market economy, limited availability of instruments to 
borrow against future incomes to finance purchase, lack of international 
portfolio diversification, a severely lacking and under-funded social safety 
net, and an aging society.  Of these, recent literature has pointed to future 
income uncertainty due to suppressed incomes and the lack of a viable social 
safety net as the two core causes for high precautionary saving.  
                                                           
64 Roach, Stephen. “China’s 12th Five-Year Plan: Strategy vs. Tactics.” Morgan Stanley Asia. 21 
March 2011. 
65 Ma. “China’s high savings rate.” 
66 ibid 
67 Xie, Andy. “Rebalancing Cannot Wait.”  
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 The drop in the household share of gross national disposable income 
over the past 15 years can be attributed to the fall in the labor share in 
national income, a decline in investment income due to low returns on 
financial assets, and diminished net income transfers due to the lack of a 
social safety net.  The decline in wages as a share of GDP has had the most 
impact on the drop in the household share of gross national disposable 
income as wages constitute 80% of disposable income in China.68  The 
decline in labor share caused by a compressed demographic transition, a 
prolonged process of absorbing surplus rural labor, and a lagging labor-
intensive service sector accounted for about 60% of the observed decline in 
the household income share of GDP between 1992 and 2007.69  Furthermore, 
as a share of GDP, net household interest income decreased by 50% in the 
past 15 years, which accounts for a further quarter of the decline in the 
household income share of GDP.70  The major cause for the decline in 
investment income has been the implicit tax households have been forced to 
pay.  The implicit tax rate was calculated to have averaged 13% of annual 
per-capita income from 2000 to 2007.   
 Furthermore, income redistributions from the government through 
taxes, contributions, and transfers have so far been ineffective in stabilizing 
the household share of income, contributing to uncertainty regarding the 
viability of the social safety net.  In 2005, government transfers to 
households stood at only around ½ percent of GDP, a rate well below the 
average of transfers from government to households in advanced and other 
emerging economies.71  A contributing factor to this low rate was the 1997 
pension reform that cut government liabilities while introducing individual 
pension accounts funded by mandatory employee contributions.  Prior to the 
pension reform of 1997, urban workers received pensions through their 
employers with a replacement ratio of about 75% to 80% relative to average 
wage.72  Although social welfare contributions by the household sector 
tripled from 1.4% of GDP in 1997 to 4.2% in 2007, workers retiring after 
1997 receive a net pension that has been calculated to have a replacement 
ratio of only about 60% of average wage.73    Furthermore, multiple scandals 
associated with local pension funds have added to fears regarding the 
                                                           
68 Ma. “China’s high savings rate.” 
69 ibid 
70 Ma. “China’s high savings rate.” 
71 Aziz, Jahangir. “Explaining China’s Low Consumption.” 
72 Prasad, Eswar. “Income Uncertainty and Household Savings in China.” IZA Discussion 
Paper No. 5331. November 2010. 
73 Ma. “China’s high savings rate.” 
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viability of the current pension programs.74  In addition, the privatization of 
the medical and education systems has led to the Chinese government 
spending only around 3 percent of GDP on health and education, a rate that is 
one of the lowest in the world.75  The low government spending in these 
areas adds additional financial burdens to Chinese households.   
 A recent study by Prasad (2010) found that over half of the increase in 
China’s urban savings rate can be traced to the two main causes mentioned 
above: the rising income uncertainty of future income and pension reforms 
resulting in a reduced social safety net.76  Young households have responded 
to increased future income uncertainty by saving more in order to adjust 
their buffer stock of savings to the riskier environment, while older 
households have saved more due to weakened confidence in the 
sustainability of the state pension program.77  Specifically, the rise in 
inflation in recent years has augmented the negative impact of financial 
repression on household interest income.  The government’s track record of 
failing to raise interest rates to ward off inflation has played a large role in 
stirring the future income uncertainty of households.   
 The following question then arises: would raising the interest rate 
reduce the propensity to save, thereby boosting consumption by Chinese 
households?  I propose that the impact of higher interest rates would differ 
between the wealthier urban households and the poorer rural households. 
In a developed nation, such as the United States, households hold a 
majority of their savings in the form of stocks, bonds, and real estate rather 
than in savings deposits.  Typically, the values of financial assets and real 
assets are inversely correlated with interest rates; when rates fall, the value 
of these assets rises and vice versa.  The opposite is true for savings deposits; 
when rates fall, the value of savings deposits fall too, since less interest 
income is earned and vice versa.  However, because a majority of savings is 
allocated to financial assets and real assets rather than savings deposits, if 
interest rates decline, prices of financial assets will rise, thereby increasing 
the wealth of asset holders.  Thus, ceteris paribus, people consume more 
when interest rates are at lower levels meaning that the substitution effect is 
stronger than the income effect.  This effect is substantiated by the fact that 
                                                           
74 ibid 
75 Aziz, Jahangir. “Explaining China’s Low Consumption.” 
76 Prasad, “Income Uncertainty.” 
77 ibid 
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US consumption as a share of GDP tends to be correlated with the 
performance of the asset markets, reflecting the wealth effect.78  
Wealthier households in China would respond similarly to typical 
households in the West, as they are able to diversify their savings away from 
bank deposits into real assets and thus are able to avoid the implicit tax on 
savings deposits.  Driven by negative returns on bank deposits, wealthier 
households have been incentivized to allocate their capital into more risky 
financial products such as stocks and real estate even as asset bubbles loom 
ominously in these markets.  Such a trend is reflected in the high proportion 
of household wealth held in these assets in China.  In 2007, bank deposits 
accounted for 27% of average household wealth across China, property 
accounted for 53%, and stocks accounted for 13%.79  However, if interest 
rates were raised, the tradeoff on yields between savings deposits and 
higher-risk investments would not be as drastic, thereby reducing the 
incentive for households to allocate as much wealth into financial and real 
assets.  In doing so, higher interest rates should cool down the threat of asset 
bubbles bursting in the red-hot real estate and stock markets.   In total, it 
seems that higher interest rates would promote safer investment decisions 
among those households in China who have enough capital to diversify.  The 
number of such households, however, is quite low as the total number of 
individual investor accounts on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges 
is only about 5 percent of the population.80  
In China and certain other countries following the Asian development 
model, rising interest rates are more often associated with higher, not lower, 
consumption.81  Since a majority of rural household savings are in bank 
deposits, changing deposit rates would have a large impact on the wealth of 
these households.  To explain this phenomenon, Pettis (2010) references 
Modigliani’s life-cycle theory and proposes that Chinese households have 
targeted savings goals such as paying for their child’s education or reaching a 
certain figure to provide for retirement.  Because a majority of households 
depend on saving deposits as their main investment vehicle, a higher deposit 
rate would allow them to reach their goals faster, which in turn would 
                                                           
78 Pettis, Michael. “Chinese savings and the wealth effect.” China Financial markets. 20 April 
2010. http://mpettis.com/2010/04/chinese-savings-and-the-wealth-effect/. Accessed 21 
March 2011. 
 
79 Wang, Qing. “Impact of Stock Bubble Burst: An Update” Morgan Stanley China Economics 
Research Note, 19 October 2007. 
80 Aziz.“Explaining China’s Low Consumption.” 
81 ibid 
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decrease the portion of their incomes dedicated to savings and increase the 
portion designated for consumption.82 83  This theory assumes that the 
income effect resulting from higher interest rates would outweigh the 
substitution effect for the average Chinese household.  
However, the impact of raising deposit rates on saving and 
consumption behavior is not clearly defined.  As described earlier, the 
average household in China faces an uncertain outlook for their future 
incomes.  In addition, fully-loaded costs of living continue to rise as the 
government privatization programs have transferred the burden of paying 
for social security, private pensions, and medical insurance from the state to 
individual households.   Although the government has publicly declared its 
intentions to boost the social safety net, the means to do so remain unclear.  
Because of the continued wealth transfers away from households, 
households face a declining margin between their expected future incomes 
and their expected future living expenses, leading to greater precautionary 
saving.  Thus, if presented only with higher deposit rates without 
concomitant improvements in the outlook of their future incomes and the 
social safety net, poorer households may consume even less and save even 
more of their higher current income in the short-term.  In order to bring 
down the savings rate and drive household consumption, the Chinese 
government needs to alleviate household uncertainties by instituting a 
fundamental shift in the orientation of its economic policy.   
 
8. Policy Implications and Challenges to Reform  
At present, the structure of China’s economy can be characterized as a 
government that mines resources from the non-state sector and then uses 
the resources to subsidize a state sector composed of state-owned 
enterprises, state-controlled commercial banks, and the government itself.  
Although the economy has embraced market liberalizations when convenient, 
at its core, the economy still implicitly maintains the pro-industry mentality 
of a socialist regime.  Many of the fundamental imbalances in the Chinese 
economy can be traced to this legacy.   
Guonan (2010) found that while the government’s disposable income 
has risen from 15% of GDP in 1997 to 24% of GDP in 2008 due to higher 
                                                           
82 Pettis, Michael. “Who will pay for China’s bad loans?”  
83 Modigliani, Franco. “The Life Cycle Hypothesis of Saving and Intercountry Differences in 
the Saving Ratio,” in Induction, Growth and Trade, eds. W. A. Eltis, M. FG. Scott, and J. N. Wolfe. 
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economic growth, the government’s savings rate has also increased.84  While 
government consumption over time has remained stable at 15% of GDP, total 
government expenditure, which includes government investment spending, 
has grown from 11% of GDP in the 1990s to 20% in the 2000s.85  In other 
words, the government’s revenues have been increasingly invested in driving 
high GDP growth instead of being spent to fund pensions and other aspects of 
the social safety net.   
Furthermore, the government’s explicit support of the export industry 
is revealed in the balance of the government’s spending on tax rebates for 
exports (TREs).  The volume of TREs has grown from RMB 115 bn in 2002 to 
RMB 586.6 bn in 2008.86  In 2006, the total TREs received by exporting firms 
amounted to 14% of government tax revenue.87  On the other hand, the 
government collected RMB 1195.5 bn of income taxes and RMB 1081.2 bn of 
social insurance fees in 2007 while only spending RMB 1028 bn on social 
welfare payments, social insurance provisions, and other transfers.88   This 
means that the government actually had a net gain of RMB 1248.9 bn in net 
transfers from households in 2007.89  From these figures, it is clear that 
government budgeting clearly favors exporters over households.   
To date, the government has relied on fiscal measures to transfer this 
accumulation of wealth from the state sector back to households.  Such 
measures include increasing meager social security payments, subsidizing 
low-rent housing, and instituting direct payments to poorer citizens.  At the 
very least, the government must continue such payments while also 
continuing to strengthen the social safety net as the current public welfare 
system remains fragmented and underfunded.  The recent move to transfer a 
percentage of listed state company shares to shore up pension assets is a 
step in the right direction.90  The government should aim to create a more 
integrated and broader-based social safety net with enhanced funding from 
the central government that focuses on the low-income segments of the 
population.91  However, these policies are only after-the-fact attempts to fix a 
structural problem.  These transfers are easier for the government to 
implement than fundamental shifts in monetary policy, but are unsustainable 
as the associated costs of the transfers will only continue to rise over time. 
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Rather than relying solely on fiscal transfers to subsidize consumption, 
the government needs to shift its focus towards boosting personal incomes 
as well.  Such a transition requires rebalancing the systemic transfers of 
wealth that are now heavily skewed against households.  Equitable 
macroeconomic policies, such as liberalized interest rates and a well-
developed and efficient financial sector that adequately distributes gains 
from economic growth to households are essential ingredients for balanced 
and sustainable growth.  The only way the government can earn back 
household confidence is by following through on promises to boost incomes.  
Otherwise, households will continue to engaging in high levels of 
precautionary saving due to the perception of a shrinking spread between 
their future incomes and future costs of living.  
However, there are tremendous challenges to implementing the 
structural reforms required to rebalance the Chinese economy while 
maintaining robust internal demand.  Increasing income for households will 
necessitate decreasing resources accrued to the government and enterprises.  
In addition, those sectors of the economy that have benefitted most from 
these policies, namely the government, SOEs and SCBs, will strongly oppose 
any reforms that remove the subsidies they have been receiving.  
Furthermore, China is in the midst of a leadership transition, as the current 
central leadership will be replaced in 2012.  Many top executives of SOEs and 
provincial leaders are members of the powerful Central Committee of the 
Communist Party and senior leaders in Beijing need their support in gaining 
coveted seats on the Politburo for themselves or their protégés, which only 
increases the pressures to maintain the status quo.92   
The two most-often stated goals of monetary policy in China are to 
avoid instability by improving standards of living and to develop a virtuous 
cycle of economic improvements.93  Moving towards these targets requires a 
well-functioning financial system that promotes continued growth and 
development. However, the overarching prerogative of the Chinese 
government is social stability and opponents of further liberalization will 
most likely frame such changes as destabilizing.  Further declines in external 
demand could slow China’s growth rate even more, possibly to a level that 
the central leadership regards as inadequate for sustaining job growth and 
social stability.  If this happens, the government will resort once again to 
stimulative policies centered on pumping liquidity into the economy.  In 
relative terms, fostering a high rate of growth is the easiest cure for deep 
                                                           
92 Pei, Minxin. “China’s Bumpy Ride Ahead.” The Diplomat. http://the-diplomat.com/whats-
next-china/chinas-bumpy-ride-ahead. 16 February 2011. Accessed 1 March 2011. 
93 Naughton, Barry. The Chinese Economy. 
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structural problems as it diminishes the scale of past mistakes while also 
creating the resources to deal with the problems.94  The PBC has also 
historically reduced interest rates when the RMB has appreciated in order to 
mollify sectors hurt the most, and specifically exporters with their strong 
governmental lobby.  With heavy global pressure on the RMB to continue 
appreciating, the PBC may be compelled to repeat its past actions, which 
would only exacerbate the aforementioned imbalances.   
 
9.  Conclusion  
For the past three decades of reform, the Chinese government has 
looked to enterprises as the driving force behind the nation’s continued 
economic growth and development.  While the quality of living for Chinese 
households has elevated dramatically across the board, economic gains 
accrue to households only after the state and state-backed institutions have 
taken more than their fair share.   
The unveiling of the Chinese government’s 12th Five-Year Plan finally 
places the economic focus on the household.  The central goal of the policy is 
to shift the Chinese economy away from relying on export- and investment-
led growth and instead towards domestic consumption.  To realize this shift, 
the government plans to focus on increasing jobs in the service sector, 
boosting rural incomes, and improving the social safety net.95 
The success of 12th Five-Year Plan depends primarily on whether the 
government is able to fundamentally shift the structure of its economy from 
that of one fixated on funneling resources into high investment for the sake 
of driving GDP growth to one that distributes economic resources more 
equitably and sustainably.  The liberalization of interest rates would 
demonstrate a commitment to the latter orientation.  The suppression of 
interest rates has been a cornerstone policy for fostering the growth of the 
state and state-backed sectors to the detriment of households.  As this paper 
has calculated, suppressed deposit rates have imposed an implicit tax of 
about 13% annually on households to subsidize a lower cost of capital for 
businesses and the government.  From 2000 to 2007, the average household 
was undercompensated by an amount roughly equivalent to an entire year’s 
salary in 2007.    
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However, merely raising interest rates will not be enough.  Without 
the aforementioned economic policy shift, Chinese households will continue 
to be apprehensive about their economic futures, leading to sustained high 
savings and low consumption.  Instead, a market-based interest rate must be 
coupled with a broadened financial system that creates alternative 
investment opportunities for households and a more responsible business 
sector that distributes a greater share of profits to households as dividends.  
Furthermore, the government must make a renewed and earnest effort to 
create a viable and well-funded social safety net.  Only by achieving 
significant progress on all these fronts can the government instill confidence 
and permanently boost household consumptions levels.   
If the Chinese government does not fundamentally reorient its 
economic policies, any efforts to achieve the goals outlined in the 12th Five-
Year Plan will be in vain.  The government would instead be forced to 
continue to rely on short-sighted fiscal transfers to assuage an increasingly 
volatile population.  If the government chooses this unsustainable route, it 
will only be delaying an inevitable policy transformation that becomes more 
costly by the day.   
It will not be costless to implement the proposed policies.  But the 
fundamental shifts they bring are integral for China’s sustainable 
development.  The tradeoff comes down to whether the government values 
short-term stability or long-term viability.  Although it is unlikely that the 
government will wander far from its monetary policy orthodoxy, it would 
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11.   Appendix 
Appendix 1: China Population96 
Total
Population
(year-end) Population Proportion Population Proportion
2000 126743 45906 36.22 80837 63.78
2001 127627 48064 37.66 79563 62.34
2002 128453 50212 39.09 78241 60.91
2003 129227 52376 40.53 76851 59.47
2004 129988 54283 41.76 75705 58.24
2005 130756 56212 42.99 74544 57.01
2006 131448 57706 43.90 73742 56.10






Appendix 2: China Flow of Funds97 
2-32 Flow of Funds- Physical Transactions
Households
Income from Properties: Interest Payments
Year Utilization Source Net Interest Payments
1992 6 1187 1181
1993 12 1789 1777
1994 20 2748 2727
1995 17 2938 2921
1996 24 3626 3601
1997 25 3281 3256
1998 31 3528 3497
1999 28 2912 2883
2000 40 2979 2939
2001 81 3102 3021
2002 367 3392 3025
2003 537 3525 2988
2004 1673 3770 2097
2005 1145 4053 2909
2006 1967 6305 4338
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Total Time Demand Total Time Demand
Deposits Deposits % Demand Deposits Deposits
Year Baseline
1978 210.6 128.9 81.7 38.8% 29.0 17.2 11.8
1980 395.8 304.9 90.9 23.0% 114.8 138.5 -23.7
1985 1,622.6 1,225.2 397.4 24.5% 407.9 324.3 83.6
1990 7,119.6 5,909.4 1,210.2 17.0% 1,935.1 1,700.9 234.2
1991 9,244.9 7634.9 1,610.0 17.4% 2,125.3 1,725.5 399.8
1992 11,757.3 9,445.0 2,312.3 19.7% 2,512.4 1,801.1 711.3
1993 15,203.5 12,108.3 3,095.2 20.4% 3,446.2 2,663.3 782.9
1994 21,518.8 16,838.7 4,680.1 21.7% 6,315.3 4,730.4 1,584.9
1995 29,662.3 23,778.3 5,884.1 19.8% 8,143.5 6,939.6 1,204.0
1996 38,520.8 30,873.2 7,647.6 19.9% 8,858.5 7,095.0 1,763.6
1997 46,279.8 36,226.7 10,053.1 21.7% 7,759.0 5,353.3 2,405.7
1998 53,407.5 41,791.6 11,615.9 21.7% 7,127.7 5,564.8 1,562.8
1999 59,621.8 44,955.1 14,666.7 24.6% 6,214.3 3,163.5 3,050.8
2000 64,332.4 46,141.7 18,190.7 28.3% 4,710.6 1,186.6 3,524.0
2001 73,762.4 51,434.9 22,327.5 30.3% 9,430.0 5,293.2 4,136.9
2002 86,910.7 58,788.9 28,121.8 32.4% 13,148.3 7,354.1 5,794.1
2003 103,617.7 68,498.7 35,119.0 33.9% 16,707.0 9,709.7 6,997.3
2004 119,555.4 78,138.9 41,416.5 34.6% 15,937.8 9,640.2 6,297.6
2005 141,051.0 92,263.5 48,787.5 34.6% 21,495.6 14,124.7 7,370.9
2006 161,587.3 103,011.4 58,575.9 36.3% 20,536.3 10,777.3 9,766.7
2007 172,534.2 104,934.5 67,599.7 39.2% 10,946.9 1,923.1 9,023.8
2008 217,885.4 139,300.2 78,585.2 36.1% 45,351.2 34,369.4 10,983.6
http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/statisticaldata/yearlydata/YB1996e/Q17-10e.htm
9-3  Savings Deposit of Urban and Rural Household
(100 million yuan)
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 Appendix 4: Baseline Prime Rates, Federal Funds Rates, and Nominal GDP 
Growth99 
Column1 US CODI US Prime US Fed US GDP Aus PrimeAus Fed Aus GDP Can PrimeCan DepositCan GDP ECB LendingECB DepositEU GDP China 1-Yr LendingChi a DepositCh na GDP
2000 6.46% 9.50% 6.24% 6.43% 9.27% 5.90% 6.61% 7.27% 3.48% 9.58% 5.75% 3.75% 6.10% 5.85% 2.25% 10.64%
2001 3.69% 4.75% 3.89% 3.39% 8.66% 5.06% 6.78% 5.81% 2.25% 2.92% 4.25% 2.25% 4.30% 5.85% 2.25% 10.52%
2002 1.73% 4.25% 1.67% 3.48% 8.16% 4.55% 7.10% 4.21% 0.83% 4.05% 3.75% 1.75% 3.20% 5.31% 1.98% 9.74%
2003 1.15% 4.00% 1.13% 4.71% 8.41% 4.81% 5.95% 4.69% 1.10% 5.23% 3.00% 1.00% 2.90% 5.31% 1.98% 12.87%
2004 1.45% 5.25% 1.35% 6.52% 8.85% 5.25% 7.53% 4.00% 0.78% 6.41% 3.00% 1.00% 4.40% 5.58% 2.25% 17.71%
2005 3.51% 7.25% 3.21% 6.50% 9.06% 5.46% 7.04% 4.42% 0.79% 6.42% 3.25% 1.25% 3.90% 5.58% 2.25% 15.67%
2006 5.15% 8.25% 4.96% 6.01% 9.41% 5.81% 8.09% 5.81% 1.83% 5.57% 4.50% 2.50% 5.30% 6.12% 2.52% 16.97%
2007 5.27% 7.25% 5.02% 5.44% 8.20% 6.39% 9.05% 6.10% 2.08% 5.46% 5.00% 3.00% 5.00% 7.47% 4.14% 22.88%  
Appendix 5: Derived Rates100 
End of Year CN Nom GDP (Tn) GDP Growth China CPI China CPI2 Official 1-Yr Deposit 1/2 Spread 2002 Real Rate GDP Proj.
2000 9.92 10.64% 0.26 0.26% 2.25% 4.05% 3.01% 6.77%
2001 10.97 10.52% 0.72 0.72% 2.25% 4.05% 3.47% 6.69%
2002 12.03 9.74% -0.77 -0.77% 1.98% 3.65% 1.98% 6.11%
2003 13.58 12.87% 1.16 1.16% 1.98% 3.65% 3.90% 8.41%
2004 15.99 17.71% 3.88 3.88% 2.25% 3.92% 6.63% 11.94%
2005 18.49 15.67% 1.82 1.82% 2.25% 3.92% 4.57% 10.45%
2006 21.63 16.97% 1.46 1.46% 2.52% 4.32% 4.21% 11.40%
2007 26.58 22.88% 4.75 4.75% 4.14% 5.81% 7.50% 15.72%  


























2000 1.263 3,712 9,921.5 2.06% 6,433.2 450.0 5,983.2 4,826.3 293.9 2.25% 4.05% 3.01% 6.77%
2001 1.272 4,059 10,965.5 2.05% 7,376.2 700.0 6,676.2 5,496.4 302.1 2.25% 4.05% 3.47% 6.69%
2002 1.280 4,519 12,033.3 0.58% 8,691.1 1,050.0 7,641.1 6,419.8 302.5 1.98% 3.65% 1.98% 6.11%
2003 1.288 4,993 13,582.3 2.61% 10,361.8 1,450.0 8,911.8 7,531.1 298.8 1.98% 3.65% 3.90% 8.41%
2004 1.296 5,645 15,987.8 6.91% 11,955.5 2,000.0 9,955.5 8,632.9 209.7 2.25% 3.92% 6.63% 11.94%
2005 1.304 6,367 18,493.7 3.93% 14,105.1 2,100.0 12,005.1 11,129.8 290.9 2.25% 3.92% 4.57% 10.45%
2006 1.311 7,175 21,631.4 3.79% 16,158.7 2,300.0 13,858.7 13,353.2 433.8 2.52% 4.32% 4.21% 11.40%
2007 1.318 8,475 26,581.0 17,253.4 3,200.0 14,053.4 17,253.4 445.5 4.14% 5.81% 7.50% 15.72%  














Transfers as % 




GDP Proj. GDP Proj.
Transfer Per 
Capita (RMB)
Transfers as % 
of Per Capita 
Income
GDP Proj.
235.1 189.7 186.2 5.0% 2.4% 98.7 79.7 78.2 2.1% 1.0% 590.4 476.2 467.6 12.6% 6.0%
241.7 199.0 190.0 4.7% 2.2% 163.6 134.7 128.7 3.2% 1.5% 595.7 490.4 468.4 11.5% 5.4%
254.4 213.7 198.7 4.4% 2.1% 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0% 0.0% 631.4 530.5 493.1 10.9% 5.2%
251.2 212.3 195.0 3.9% 1.8% 290.0 245.1 225.1 4.5% 2.1% 969.5 819.3 752.5 15.1% 7.1%
155.2 134.6 119.7 2.1% 1.0% 408.3 354.0 315.0 5.6% 2.6% 903.5 783.5 697.1 12.3% 5.7%
215.2 199.5 165.1 2.6% 1.2% 299.6 277.8 229.8 3.6% 1.6% 1,060.5 983.1 813.4 12.8% 5.7%
309.9 298.6 236.4 3.3% 1.4% 290.8 280.2 221.8 3.1% 1.3% 1,528.4 1,472.6 1,165.8 16.2% 7.1%
179.2 179.2 135.9 1.6% 0.7% 361.1 361.1 274.0 3.2% 1.4% 1,246.4 1,246.4 945.8 11.2% 4.7%
Avg: 24.5 3.5% 1.6% 49.4 3.2% 1.4% 170.6 12.8% 5.9%
Sum: 1,841.9 1,626.5 1,427.0 6.1% 1,912.2 1,732.6 1,472.6 6.5% 7,525.8 6,802.1 5,803.7 25.6%  
                                                           
99 Bloomberg and WorldBank 
100 China rates from PBC  
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1999 -1.25% 5,962.2 300.0 5,662.2
2000 3,712 2.06% 6,433.2 450.0 5,983.2 321.1 293.9 27.2 1.263 5.19% 232.8 4,738.7
2001 4,059 2.05% 7,376.2 700.0 6,676.2 693.0 302.1 390.9 1.272 5.05% 237.5 5,249.2
2002 4,519 0.58% 8,691.1 1,050.0 7,641.1 964.8 302.5 662.3 1.280 4.53% 236.3 5,967.7
2003 4,993 2.61% 10,361.8 1,450.0 8,911.8 1,270.7 298.8 971.9 1.288 3.91% 231.9 6,916.9
2004 5,645 6.91% 11,955.5 2,000.0 9,955.5 1,043.8 209.7 834.0 1.296 2.35% 161.8 7,681.3
2005 6,367 3.93% 14,105.1 2,100.0 12,005.1 2,049.6 290.9 1,758.7 1.304 2.92% 223.1 9,208.3
2006 7,175 3.79% 16,158.7 2,300.0 13,858.7 1,853.6 433.8 1,419.8 1.311 3.61% 330.9 10,571.0
2007 8,475 17,253.4 3,200.0 14,053.4 194.7 445.5 -250.8 1.318 3.21% 338.0 10,663.6  
1/2 Margin 2002 Real Rate GDP Proj.






































9.34% 529.0 6,218.4 419.0 4,924.9 6.93% 392.7 6,082.0 311.0 4,816.9 15.62% 884.3 6,573.6 700.4 5,206.2
9.09% 565.1 7,174.4 444.3 5,640.9 7.78% 473.4 6,946.3 372.2 5,461.6 15.00% 986.3 7,950.9 775.5 6,251.4
8.34% 598.4 8,435.1 467.4 6,587.9 4.53% 314.7 7,923.4 245.8 6,188.2 13.99% 1,112.2 9,725.4 868.6 7,595.6
7.20% 607.2 10,014.2 471.3 7,772.6 7.71% 610.5 9,505.8 473.9 7,378.0 16.60% 1,614.3 12,311.6 1,252.9 9,555.8
4.09% 410.1 11,258.4 316.4 8,686.5 6.93% 659.2 10,999.1 508.6 8,486.5 12.49% 1,537.9 14,683.6 1,186.6 11,329.3
5.08% 572.3 13,589.4 439.0 10,423.6 5.93% 652.4 13,410.1 500.4 10,286.1 13.57% 1,993.1 18,435.4 1,528.8 14,140.6
6.19% 841.8 15,851.0 642.1 12,090.6 6.04% 809.4 15,639.3 617.4 11,929.1 16.34% 3,013.2 22,868.5 2,298.4 17,443.3
4.51% 714.4 16,314.7 542.1 12,379.4 5.82% 910.3 16,298.8 690.7 12,367.4 12.21% 2,791.8 25,409.5 2,118.4 19,280.5
1,715.8 1,703.8 8,616.9  
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